Despite attempts to secure harrnonisation of accounting practice, significant variations in accounting rules and practice continue to arise in European countries, variations which give rise to compliance costs for multinational companies.
Introduction:
Despite the effects of governments, through the European Union (EU), and the accounting profession, through the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), substantial variations in accounting rules and practice continue to arise between different European Countries. These variations give rise to both financing and compliance costs for European multinationals. In this paper we report on our discussions with leading accountants in Spain, Sweden, and Austria on the implementation of the EU 4 th and 7 th Company Law Directives on accounting harmonisation in their countries.
Specifically we:
1. Briefly survey the relevance of international accounting harmonisation for European business, and the work of two bodies, the EU and IASC, pursuing this objective:
2. Compare the rules of the government and the accounting profession in accounting regulation in each of the three countries.
3. Analyse the response of each country for the requirement of accounts to give a 'true and fair view' that lies at the heart of the EU 4 th directive on accounting harmonisation.
4. Consider how each country has adapted the traditional tax-accounting link with the light of EU harmonisation.
The pursuit of harmonisation Multi-national business has two main reasons to seek international accounting harmonisation:
1. The problems of analysing accounts from different countries increase finance costs in international capital markets. Levich (1990, 1991) report on a study of international investors. In response to the question 'Does accounting diversity affect your capital market decisions', 9 replied yes, and 7, no.
2.
The cost of an accounting system in a multinational is increased both by the cost of designing, and running different accounting systems in different countries, and the cost of adjusting accounts from different countries to the accounting system of the country of the holding company for consolidation purposes. Cecchini (1988) reports on a survey of European multinational companies showing that different national accounting systems caused between 10% and 30% of the total accounting costs.
Both these factors hold back the ideal of building a comprehensive and effective free market in Europe. A third point of interest to the European Union (EU) is to avoid any individual member state setting low standards of accounting disclosure so as to attract registration of companies attached to secrecy, at the expense of other EU members. Other parties with a particular interest in achieving international accounting harmonisation are:
1 "The Big 6" leading international accounting firms, who can achieve substantial savings on costs of recruitment, training and staff development.
Developing countries, who by adopting internationally agreed accounting standards save the cost of devising these at the national level.
There is substantial evidence of international diversity in accounting regulation and practice at both the European level (see for example Simmonds & Azieres, 1989 ) and the International level (see for examples Radebaugh and Gray, 1993, The Economist 1992) The European Union has pursued harmonisation through three directives on company law:
1.
In 1978 the fourth directive laid down requirements for individual company accounts.
In 1983 the seventh directive laid down requirements for group accounts.
3.
In 1984 the eighth directive addressed the issue of audit requirements.
Van Hulle (1991) summarises the content of the EU 4th Directive:
"The directive itself is a combination of rigidity and flexibility. There is rigidity in: the mandatory layouts for the balance sheet and profit and loss account; the valuation rules and notably the limited possibility to depart from the historical cost principle; the minimum content of the notes and the annual report; and in the audit and disclosure requirements. There is flexibility in: the true and fair override; the many options both for member states and for companies; the fact that the provisions of the directive are minimum requirements; and the possibility to derogate from certain provisions in exceptional cases provided that disclosures are made in the notes on the accounts" (p.25)
The significance of the True and Fair View concept is explored in more detail below. In the context of the European Union its role has been, along with the range of options, to introduce an Anglo-Saxon dimension into a directive which would otherwise have had a strong 'continental European' orientation.
Van der Tas (1988) makes two distinctions between types of accounting harmonisation.
1)
Formal harmonisation is harmonisation of the provisions concerning financial reporting.
Material harmonisation is harmonisation of financial reporting practice itself. Other authorities refer to 'formal' harmonisation as 'de jure' and 'material' harmonisation as 'de facto'.
2) Disclosure harmonisation is concerned with the extent of information disclosure.
Measurement harmonisation is concerned with the nature of the information disclosed.
Macharzina (1988) observes of the 4th Directive that:
"there is much leeway as regards adoption of accounting, and, in particular, measurement methods".
Given the EU has achieved a higher level of disclosure than measurement harmonisation, there is a danger that European accounts will appear similar while having hidden measurement differences.
Montagna (1986) argues:
"The result is a set of weak regulations. Disclosure remains general and vague. There are many rules but they produce little meaningful information ……….one requirement that would greatly strengthen the accountability of the international capital markets to investors and the public, the disclosure of secret reserves, is missing. As the managing partner of a Big Nine Zurich office said, we will always have harmonisation in areas that are not important" (p. 118).
Blake and Amat (1994) offer an analysis of the obstacles to the EU accounting harmonisation at four levels, as summarised in table 1.
1.The EU itself has failed to produce directives that provide for a comprehensive scheme of accounting harmonisation. Major areas of controversy have been ignored; thus the EU directives
give no guidance on foreign currency translation, deferred taxation, or accounting for lease commitments. In other areas individual countries may choose from a range of options; an example is the permitted range of formats.
2. At the stage of national legislation some countries have interpreted the directives in line with national accounting traditions. To give two illustrations:
• The German draft law introducing the EC fourth directive offered the comment on the 'true and fair view' requirement: 'In spite of the pretentious formulation it is supposed that for practice there will be no principal changes' (Busse von Colbe, 1984, p.123 ).
• In the UK, the minister responsible for implementing the fourth directive announced in parliament that the UK government was 'at pains to impose the minimum change necessary in actual accounting practice ' (cited in McBarnet & Whelan, 1992, p99) .
3. National accounting professions have, on occasion, interpreted national legislation implementing the EU fourth directive in a conflicting national tradition. Thus while the fourth directive prescribes that all assets with a finite useful life should be depreciated, a UK standard, SSAP 19, prescribed annual revaluation instead of depreciation for investment properties.
4. At the individual company level there may be failure to comply with the spirit of the rules. As an example, in Germany some 90% of companies fail to file their published accounts (see van Hulle, 1993, pp390-l) . The failure of European Union harmonisation is not only apparent at the 'formal' level of the rules, but also at the 'material' level of actual accounting practice. Table 2 shows, in descending order, the degree of material harmonisation achieved by eight European countries across nine areas of measurement practice. Three of the four most harmonised areas in practice are not even covered by EU directives. Holding Companies (Cairns, 1995) . The board meets three times a year, being responsible for the approval of all exposure drafts and standards as well as the general management of IASC. The board is supported by an advisory council to promote both financing and the use of International Accounting Standards and by a consultation group of parties with an interest in accounting. The IASC constitution defines its objectives:-"To formulate and publish in the public interest accounting standards to be observed in the presentation of financial statements and to promote their world-wide acceptance and observance.
To work generally for the improvement and harmonisation of regulations, accounting standards and procedures relating to the presentation of financial statements" (taken from Cairns, 1995 Cairns, , p 1667 ).
Since 1973 IASC has issued over 30 standards.
Enforcement of lAS's poses a major challenge. Nobes (1995) points out that IASC can only seek to enforce accounting standards through its member bodies, not by its own authority. In countries such as France and Germany professional accounting bodies have little influence over the setting of accounting rules by the government and governmental bodies, and so can only promote lAS's by persuasion. By contrast in Canada, where accounting standards are issued by the accounting profession, and enforced by law, it is easy to promote lAS's. Cairns (1989) reports that only 4 of the countries on the IASC board set their own national standards. In the UK the accounting profession ceased to control the national process for accounting standards in 1990. It is interesting to note that:
"From 1993, larger gaps between UK and IASC standards have opened up" (Nobes, 1995, p 84 ).
Nobes goes on to observe:
"One tell-tale sign of the problems of enforcement is the gradual weakening of the commitments required from member bodies. At one stage, members were required to use their best endeavours to ensure that companies who broke international standards would disclose this fact. Now the IASC preface calls for companies that observe the standards to disclose this fact."
The acceptance of international standards by professional bodies who have no control over their own national standards has been described as 'a symbolic act at best' (McComb, 1982, p 48 To summarise, there are two bodies driving for accounting harmonisation in Europe. The effectiveness of IASC depends on the influence of the national accounting profession. The effectiveness of the European Union depends on a consistent application of the true and fair view.
Harmonisation can be held back by national tax considerations-We now, therefore, turn to a review of each of these issues in each of our three countries.
Sources of Authority
In 1829 the first Spanish Commercial Code was enacted, including detailed instructions on bookkeeping for business and being strongly influenced by the French Napoleonic Code of 1807.
The accounting requirements of this code were concerned purely with internal bookkeeping arrangements, and:
"'did not include valuation methods or internal reporting, since at that time the accounts were considered to be a business secret, knowledge of which was restricted to the owner of the business and, in the event of litigation, to the judge" (Gonzalo & Gallizo, 1992, p 74) .
The code has subsequently been amended in 1885, 1973, and 1989 To summarise, historically the regulation of accounting in Spain has been through control of the bookkeeping system rather than the financial statements. We have observed that if Spanish accountants are asked to explain an accounting rule, their reply will refer to the entries through the double entry system rather than the impact on the financial statements. Only as recently as 1973 do we find accounting regulation for companies in general that deals with the financial statements. This regulation was tax based and aimed primarily at creditor protection. Both these bodies formulate auditing standards, subject to review by ICAC.
Alongside these professional bodies for auditors exists a voluntary body, the Asociaci6n Española The Accounting Act requires companies to follow 'God Redovisnings Sed' (GRS), Good
Accounting Practice. Practitioners we spoke to referred to this as 'Swedish GAAP', on implicit comparison with the US requirement that companies follow 'Generally Accepted Accounting Principles'. In fact, there are substantial differences between the US concept of 'GAAP', which draws on a hierarchy of official recommendations headed up by the standards issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (see Sunter 1991) and GRS in Sweden. 'GRS' in Sweden arises when two conditions are met:
1) A practice is specified by one of the three bodies discussed above.
2) A representative sample of leading companies follow the official recommendation.
Thus to achieve the status of 'GRS' in Sweden an accounting recommendation must both come from an authoritative body and be accepted by a number of companies. Accounting regulators cannot, as in the US or UK, impose a standard against the views of the business community. An interesting aspect of this system is that recommendations of RR, designed for listed companies, will, if accepted, become 'GRS', and therefore apply to all companies.
Another important difference between 'GRS' in Sweden and 'GAAP' in the USA is that Sweden has a substantial body of accounting and tax law, all of which ranks above GRS (Westermark 1989 ).
Overall, practitioners we spoke to felt that the Swedish legislation had implemented the EU directives in a very narrow and prescriptive way, following the German approach. They would have preferred the government to allow the full range of options and discretion permitted in the directives, as they felt had been the case in Denmark. They saw the most important influences on Swedish accountants as, in order., the International Accounting Standards Committee, the USA, and the UK. Indeed, one practitioner observed that he read all documentation from the UK Accounting Standards Board and took this as guidance on areas not covered by accounting recommendations in Sweden.
Thus the implementation of the EU directives in Sweden, with its emphasis on a prescriptive taxdriven accounting system in the German tradition, was a disappointment to practitioners. To illustrate this with some quotes from practitioners on this implementation:
"Quoted companies would prefer Anglo-Saxon solutions rather than the approach offered by the Fourth Directive".
"The European Union has pushed Swedish accounting towards a German approach which is a pity and old fashioned in a number of ways".
"The Swedish government overreacted to the demands of the EU". (Rechnunglegungsgesetz -RLG), and so Austria started on the road to harmonisation of accounting law some time before it actually joined the EU. Austria was undoubtedly helped in this by the existence of German law which it adopted with few amendments.
A further harmonising law is being enacted in Austria during 1997, and this will complete the legal process of harmonisation. These changes in the law have meant radical changes to accounting.
Several of our interviewees referred to the poor information content of accounts prior to the new laws; for example, there used to be no figure for turnover in the profit and loss account and the gross profit figure which was disclosed was not comparable from one company to another.
Another significant change relates to group accounting, which was introduced in Austria in 1994.
The result of all the recent changes is that Austrian accounts now bear a much closer resemblance to those produced elsewhere in Europe, but the process of harmonisation has required a very rapid evolution of thinking and practice in accounting, the effects of which will take many years to assimilate. Austrian accountants have not been accustomed to preparing accounts which have a high information content, or which are expected to provide decision-useful information to a wide range of users.
There are two main accounting bodies in Austria; the Chamber of Public Accountants and the Institute of Austrian Certified Accountants. All qualified accountants are members of the Chamber, which represents the profession and acts on behalf of its members. Some 80-90% of accountants are also members of the Institute (Wagenhofer, 1996) The most important objective of Austrian accounting is, and has been historically, the protection of creditors, which has led to a very conservative tradition of accounting. A second and much more recently established objective, the provision of information, has been given impetus by two factors: firstly, a series of highly published bankruptcies in the 1980s, and secondly, the introduction of harmonising legislation. An example of the alteration in emphasis is the introduction of group accounting via the RLG 1990 which has its main objective the provision of information.
In Austria sole traders and partnerships are a legal form of business entity and come within the scope of the Commercial Code which requires all forms of legal entity, both incorporated and unincorporated, to keep good accounting records and to prepare accounts. There are two important concepts underlying current Austrian accounting: the "true and fair view" and "good accounting practice" (Grundsatz ordnungsmassiger Buchfuhrung).
GoB, good accounting principles, are implemented by reference to several sources including the Commercial Code, accounting literature, the courts and from day to day practice (Wagenhofer, 1996) . Apart from the general requirement that accounts should be prepared in accordance with
GoB there are general concepts set out in the law: for example, clarity, consistency, up to dateness, going concern, valuation of assets and liabilities individually, and prudence. Other concepts derive from accounting literature for example, the accruals concept and materiality.
However, GoB are dynamic principles; although some elements of the principles are established in law and accounting literature, they tend to develop over time through commercial practice combined with prescription in law. Our interviews indicated that these principles are recognised and agreed upon by accountants, without necessarily being expressly enshrined in regulation: for example: "Naturally, there are books about it, and there are lectures on it at the University, but in practice it's in your head".
There is an interesting contrast between our three countries. Spain has experienced a major change in the thrust of national accounting regulation driven by a voluntary association of practitioners. In Sweden practitioners have not achieved implementation of the EU directives in the spirit they would prefer. In Austria, practitioners have less influence both on legislation and through accounting recommendations. Table 3 summarises some key aspects. 
Satisfied Disappointed Satisfied
The true and fair view
The EU 4th Directive requires:
1) That company accounts should present a true and fair view (TFV).
2) That where compliance with specific legal requirements does not, in itself, result in the provision of a true and fair view then additional information must be given in the accounts to achieve that end.
3)
In 'exceptional cases' companies should not comply with specific accounting rules where this is necessary, in order to provide a true and fair view. This is referred to as the TFV 'override'.
Spain has incorporated all three of these requirements in it's company law. In Sweden and Austria only the first two have been adopted; neither country has accepted the TFV override.
The term 'true and fair view' first appears in legislation in the UK Companies Act of 1947. It has never been defined in either UK or European law, and a range of meanings can be attached to it.
Thus, one study concluded 'True and fair is what you make it." (Chastrey 1975 p92). Higson and
Blake (1993) identify four distinct, and sometimes conflicting, elements in the term:
1) It appears that originally accountants lobbied for the term 'true and fair' to replace the previous term 'true and correct', on the grounds that the latter term implied an unachievable degree of precision. Thus the term was seen as a relaxation of the accountant's duty.
2) Conversely, the term has been seen as adding to the accountant's duty in that accounts must not only present the literal truth but also comply with the spirit of the law to give a 'fair' view. As Benson (1989) argues: "In effect substance took precedence over form".
3) 'Fairness' has also been taken to imply that accounts should be free from bias, giving as objective a picture as possible.
4)
Another aspect of the term is that it has been regarded as giving authority to official pronouncements from the accounting profession, such as the Financial Reporting Standards (FRS's), and Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP's) issued in the UK.
When the UK joined the European Union in 1973, a first draft of a directive on company accounts had already been formulated. This followed the French and German tradition of rigid and detailed rules on accounting procedures and disclosures. UK accountants lobbied successfully for both the TFV requirement and a range of options to be brought into revised drafts. Together these changes allowed the UK to retain its traditional flexibility in accounting approaches. One leading UK auditor summed up the spirit of the UK profession with the observation "we seem to have managed to stitch the rest of Europe up under true and fair now" (Higson & Blake 1993,p113) .
The Spanish practitioners we spoke to were agreed in welcoming the 'true and fair view' requirement, which translates into Spanish as 'imagen fiel' -'faithful picture', -an adoption of the French official translation 'image fidele'. Some use of the TFV override appears to be made in Spain. Navarro Gomollon (1995) reports that in a sample of 49 unqualified audit reports, two refer to use of the override. In a survey of 150 company accounts Ernst & Young (1995) give four examples of use of the override. We put two examples of possible cases for use of the override to Spanish auditors:
1) The deduction of the unamortised discount on a deep discounted debenture from the nominal value of the debenture rather than showing it as an asset, the latter being the treatment in the Spanish PGC. We chose this as an example of use of the override which we had seen in a Spanish company's accounts, and therefore, saw as a defensible use of the override.
2) An 'in substance defeasance of debt' transaction, whereby a company had bought government securities and placed them in an irrevocable trust to cover the payments of interest and principal on a loan. The PGC, applying the 'no set off' rules of the fourth directive, would require both the liability and the assets to be shown in the accounts. We asked whether the alternative treatment, of removing both the liability and the related assets from the Balance Sheet, could be justified by the override. We chose this as an extreme case, where use of the override has only been tentatively suggested as a possibility (see Walton 1985) .
Auditors were evenly divided as to whether they would agree with use of the override in the first case, and unanimous in rejecting the second case. To summarise, Spanish auditors seem to welcome the principle of the true and fair view but to be cautious in use of the override.
In Sweden, TFV has been translated as 'rattvisande bild', a term which interviewees were agreed in translating as 'a fair view'. The translation has not given rise to controversy. Sweden has not adopted the TFV override.
Practitioners we spoke to were divided on the issue as to whether they would wish to see such an override provision in the law. On the one hand those in favour argued:
1) An override would help companies wishing to override some particularly inflexible aspects of accounting law. An example cited is that some ten companies currently show listed investments at market price, a practice that will not be allowed under strict historic cost rules in the new Act.
2) An override would also help companies comply with International Accounting Standards.
An example is that the law does not permit foreign exchange translation gains to be taken as profit.
3) The override would be useful as a tool against creative accounting. The example of some 'creative' sale and leaseback deals on real estate was mentioned.
As the Accounting Act becomes older, new circumstances not envisaged in the Act may arise that make an override useful. An example is the complexity of some new financial instruments.
Against this, some practitioners saw the concept of an override provision as alien to the Swedish tradition, while extra disclosure should be an adequate solution. Two practitioners felt that ambiguity in application of an override could give rise to conflict between client and auditor.
In Austria, an early translation of a true and fair view appeared in the Public Corporations Act (Aktiengesetz -AKtG), the forerunner of the current Commercial Code, and the RLG 1990. The
AKtG translated "a true and fair view" as "ein moglichst sicherer Einblick" which translates back into English as "a surest possible insight". This translation was criticised for enabling a tradition of interpretation to be established (Novotny 1992). In addition the work "sicher" implied caution and suggested that values were uncertain and indeterminable in the future. (Altenburger, 1989, quoted by Loidl, 1994) . The translation of a true and fair view introduced in the Commercial
Code by the RLG of 1990 and currently used in Austria, is "ein moglichst getreues Bild" which translates literally as "a truest possible picture".
One interviewee, commenting on the close relationship between German and Austrian accounting law, illustrated the point with the example of the RLG 1990; when this Act was written the law makers simply took the German Financial Reporting Act almost word for word leaving out only those sections relating to shipping law which, as Austria no longer had a coast line, were not relevant. It is noteworthy, however, that these two closely linked accounting communities translated "true and fair view" differently. In Germany the translation is "ein den tatsachlichen
Verhalttnissen entsprechendes Bild" (s 264 Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch -dHGB). This translates literally back into English as "a picture according to the facts". This translation was not taken into Austrian law because it was felt that there would be a danger of misunderstanding, and that the principles and the law cannot mirror the facts (Nowotny 1992). Practitioners, when asked why there were different translations for "true ~rnd fair view" in Austria and Germany, supported this explanation. One interviewee opined that the Austrian "ein moglichst getreues Bild" is more in line with the French 'fidele" and that it reflects the meaning of "true and fair view" better than the German translation. The same practitioner also had the impression that the German accounting community is not happy with their translation. Another practitioner pointed out that the use of the word "facts" in the German translation was too strong:
""Moglichst getreu"is better because the framework of valuation principles which we have means that you cannot present a picture which corresponds with the actual circumstances…"
An opinion expressed by another practitioner was that the Austrian translation in contrast to the German translation introduces the concept of materiality. It is worth noting too, that there have been no cases in the Austrian courts which test out the significance of "ein moglichst getreues
Bild", and so in all instances, the matter is to some extent one of personal interpretation.
However, it is significant that the issue of translation has been given so much thought in a country where commercial law is usually adopted without significant change in Germany.
Although it would appear that there is a linguistic difference between the German and the Austrian translations of "true and fair view", in terms of its understanding in the law there appears to be no difference between the two interpretations of the expression. The two translations are recognised by practitioners and in the literature as being comparable. Neither Austrian nor German law has adopted the true and fair view override which permits the detailed provisions of the law to be set aside in order to enable the financial statements to present a true and fair view, even though this override is specifically part of the Directive. German and therefore Austrian law follows the Roman law approach whereby a specific rule takes precedence over a general rule and so, if there is a conflict between a specific legal principle and the general principle of "true and fair view" then a business entity must not depart from the specific rule. However, if the entity is a limited company details of the conflict must be given in the notes to the financial statements (Wagenhofer, 1996) . None of our interviewees regarded the absence of the override provision as a problem in Austrian accounting, and indeed would not welcome its introduction: 2) Only Spain has accepted the override.
3) Auditors in Sweden see the override as a help in opposing creative accounting whereas, in Austria it is seen as a hindrance. In Spain, auditors are cautious in their willingness to use the override. Keitsprinzip', translated as the 'principle of bindingness' (Nobes 1989 p8-9) or the 'principle of congruency' (Haller 1992) applies. Under this principle:
1) Generally Accepted Accounting Principles as laid down in Commercial Law apply to the published accounts and, unless they conflict with explicit tax regulation, also form the basis for taxation.
2)
In some cases tax regulations offer opportunities to reduce taxable income compared to the provisions of commercial law. These tax benefits may only be enjoyed if the same accounting treatment is followed in the published accounts.
Taken together, these two factors lend to a binding link between tax and accounting rules. The link is only broken when an expense for tax purposes is computed as a lower amount than for accounting purposes. With the notable exception of pension costs, the German tax system is generally liberal with tax allowable expenses, so that this position rarely arises.
In the US and the UK there are many areas where the accounting treatment determines the tax position, and the consequence can sometimes be an unconventional accounting approach being taken in order to minimise the tax liability. (see Slepian 1985 for a striking example in the USA).
However, in some areas tax and accounting rules differ. An important example is the depreciation of fixed assets, based on arbitrarily determined write off periods for tax purposes, but based on an assessment of actual useful lives in the published accounts. Where such a case arises an estimate of how much taxation arising from differences in the past will become payable when those differences reverse in the future has to be made. This estimate is known as 'deferred taxation'. It is only a significant issue in those countries such as the Netherlands, the UK, and the USA, where substantial differences between tax and accounting rules arise.
Historically, in Spain the link between tax and accounting rules has been a tight one, but the legislation of 1989 implementing the EU directives broke that link. Thus, referring to the pre-1989 period, Gonzalo and Gallizo (1992) observe:
"commercial law was not a major source of accounting standards, and this meant that tax regulations were the main driving force for bookkeeping and its regulation by specific rules"
(p 76).
Similarly, it was observed:
"tax law establishes channels through which accountancy must run, so that it is fiscal data" (Cea 1988 p30 -our translation).
During the 1980's, the private accounting body AECA, as discussed above, published a number of accounting recommendations. Two of the accountants we interviewed observed that a major reason for this was to break away from the traditional dominance of tax rules over accounting practice in Spain. The explicit breaking of the link in 1989 indicates the success of AECA in persuading the government to support this view. As Labatut (1993) explains:
"The anglo-saxon approach of separating and considering independently, accounting and tax principles is now firmly established" (p 208 -our translation).
As a consequence, it has become necessary to include a deferred taxation provision in Spanish company accounts.
While the legal obligation to link tax and accounting practice has gone, in some areas companies have chosen not to take advantage of the change. For example, in practice most companies still use the tax allowable depreciation figure in their published accounts. The leading practitioners we spoke to in Sweden all regretted this position, but suggested that practitioners serving small clients might have a different view. We asked each of them to summarise the arguments for and against the link, and identified the fo]lowing arguments in favour:
1) The separation of the tax and financial accounts will increase costs, a particular concern for small companies.
2) It is convenient for the tax authorities to base their assessments on audited figures.
3) It is seen as equitable that where the Government gives special tax allowances, thereby forgoing tax revenues, then the same reduction should apply to accounting profits so that shareholders similarly forego the potential for dividend payments.
4)
Since accounting rules are traditionally based on prudence, reducing reported profit, it is good for business if tax rules are influenced by accounting rules.
5)
Breaking the tax-accounting link would involve Swedish companies in the complex exercise of computing a deferred taxation provision.
Arguments against the link are:
1) It is an obstacle to good accounting practice. To minimise taxation companies aim to report a level of profit just high enough to support the dividend they wish to pay, so they compute income and expenditure in such a way as to arrive at that figure for both tax and accounting purposes. Expenditure that is tax allowable will tend to be overstated, and any expenditure that is not tax allowable will tend to be understated.
2) The tax-accounting link is an obstacle to the application of International Accounting standards in Sweden.
3) The tax accounting link creates difficulties in explaining Swedish accounts in other countries, particularly the USA and the UK. RR's first standard, on group accounts takes advantage of the fact that the consolidated accounts of a group of companies do not represent a taxable legal entity, so that the tax accounting link is not obligatory. Accordingly, Swedish consolidated accounts are now prepared in accordance with accounting, not tax, principles, and with deferred taxation shown, while the individual company accounts continue to be prepared with separate identification of tax driven 'appropriations' and 'untaxed reserves'.
Austria follows Germany in applying a strong tax accounting link. Practitioners identified some problems with this:
1) The information content of accounts suffers, because of the overriding tax influence.
2) International Accounting Standards cannot be applied where these conflict with tax rules.
3) Accounts prepared on this basis are not comparable with those prepared in the AngloAmerican tradition.
Overall, practitioners themselves did not feel strongly about problems with the link, unlike those we talked to in Sweden. However, in interviews two reasons for believing that the tax-accounting link will weaken were put forward:
1)
In a number of areas tax allowances are not generous in Austria. As an example, for tax purposes a vehicle is depreciated over 8 years but an accountant will prefer to use a more realistic life of 4 to 5 years in the published accounts. The difference gives rise to a deferred tax asset.
2)
One practitioner pointed out that the tax authorities wish to increase the tax yield from the Corporate sector and would like to break the traditional tax accounting link so as not to be bound by traditional accounting conservatism in profit measurement.
In Table 5 we show how for 3 countries, plus the UK, the relationship between tax and accounting depreciation varies. We distinguish between the 'de jure' position, as to what the rules say should be done, and the 'de facto' position as to what companies actually do:
1)
In the UK tax and accounting depreciation are separate both 'de jure' and 'de facto'.
2)
In Spain the rules stipulate that tax and accounting depreciation are separate issues, but in practice companies choose to compute both on the same basis.
3)
In Sweden the rules require that tax and accounting depreciation be on the same basis, but in practice accountants have found ingenious formulations to separate the two.
4)
In Austria, tax and accounting depreciation have traditionally been linked both 'de jure'
and 'de facto'. However, there is now some move away from this position where accountants wish to depreciate assets more rapidly than the tax rules permit.
Is depreciation for accounting purposes different to depreciation for accounting purposes? 
Conclusion
International accounting harmonisation would bring major benefits to international business, particularly within the European Union. Obstacles to the work of the bodies promoting this harmonisation include:
1) Differences in the regulatory framework in each country limits the influence of the accounting profession in supporting IASC.
2) The 'true and fair view', the fundamental principle on which EU harmonisation is built, varies in its interpretation.
3) A binding tax-accounting link ties accounting practice to national tax rules rather than international norms.
We have seen major differences between the three countries we have visited in each of these respects and in the spirit in which EU directives have been applied. Overall, our study indicates the potential for continuing diversity of national accounting practice.
To summarise, following legislation to implement the EU accounting directives Spain, Sweden, and Austria, are in three very different positions on the law and practice relating to the tax accounting link. In Spain, the accounting community have lobbied effectively to break the link, but in practice companies have not taken up the opportunities this affords in full. In Sweden, the accounting profession have failed to achieve a change in the law on the link, but have produced two ingenious accounting devices to circumvent it. In Austria, the link continues, but may be broken because the tax authorities themselves find it a constraint.
